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THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT, EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS,
AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Paul M. Secunda
Employment law commentators have paid insufficient attention to the
Solomon Amendment case of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. (FAIR) and its discussion of the right to expressive association
under the First Amendment. By failing to methodically analyze whether all law
school constituents of the FAIR organization constitute expressive associations,
the Court erroneously implied that both public and private law school members
of FAIR may be expressive associations. This state of affairs will eventually be
rectified given the strong constitutional structural arguments in opposition to such
an interpretation. But such a modification should be accompanied by a unifying
theory about how government efficiency concerns in maintaining core values and
promoting certain messages should be balanced against the First Amendment
rights of public employees to engage in protected constitutional activities. This
Article fashions a coherent constitutional analysis for these public employment
law cases by utilizing the Pickering framework and limiting the application of the
Garcetti v. Ceballos government speech doctrine. This analysis discards the notion
that the government employer has a constitutional right as an expressive
association to disassociate itself from those it deems are promoting an antithetical
message, focusing instead on whether the constitutional right of the public employee
can be recognized without substantially disrupting the public employer's enterprise.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently decided labor and employment law cases have given employee
rights advocates in the United States little reason to cheer. The National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) potentially denied collective bargaining
rights to large groups of private-sector employees in its recent Kentucky
River supervisor trilogy rulings,' and public employees saw First Amendment
1. See Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 2006-2007 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
F 17,189 (Sept. 29, 2006) (finding certain charge nurses in an acute-care hospital fell outside the
definition of "supervisor" set forth in Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act(NLRA)); Beverly Enters.-Minn., Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 2006-2007 NLRB Dec. (CCH)
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1768 2006-2007
Expressive Associations in Public Employment 1769
protections substantially diminished in so-called "official capacity" speech
cases in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.2 The
lone bright spot for employees has been the robust interpretation given by
the Supreme Court to antiretaliation provisions under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964' in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White.4
Perhaps because of the number of clearly significant employment
law decisions in the past year, no employment law commentator has
examined the Solomon Amendment case of Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
& Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR)5 and its discussion of the right to
expressive association under the First Amendment.6 This is hardly surprising,
given the less than obvious employment law connections. Nevertheless,
some very real, if unintended, employment law consequences stem from
this decision.
Since the civil rights cases of the 1950s and 196 0s first recognized the
constitutional right to association,' there has never been a satisfactory concep-
tion of what groups are protected associations for First Amendment purposes.
Andrew Morriss lamented this fact in his recent pre-FAIR piece,8 and others
scholars have concurred.9 Together, they point out that past expressive
9[ 17,191 (Sept. 29, 2006) (concluding that charge nurses at a nursing home were not supervisors
for purposes of the NLRA); Croft Metals, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. No. 38, 2006-2007 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) [ 17,190 (Sept. 29, 2006) (holding that lead persons working in a manufacturing facility
were not supervisors under the Act). As problematic as these decisions may become for the labor
movement, at least some commentators believe the decisions could have been worse for unions.
See, e.g., Posting of Jeff Hirsch to Workplace Prof Blog, Board Decides "Kentucky River" Cases,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof-blog/2006/10/boarddecides k.html (Oct. 3, 2006) ("My
personal take on these cases is that they're not great for unions, but they could have been worse.").
2. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006). For a more in-depth consideration of Garcetti v. Ceballos and
its implications for public employee First Amendment rights, see infra Part IV.B.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
4. 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (holding that Title VII antiretaliation provisions are not
confined to employment-related actions and requiring the plaintiff to "show that a reasonable
employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context
means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
5. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
6. See id. at 1311-13.
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See Andrew P. Morriss, The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association: Why
the "Solomon Amendment" Is Constitutional and Law Schools Are Not Expressive Associations, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 415, 444 (2005) ("The Supreme Court's expressive association cases
are . . . of little direct guidance on the question of what constitutes an expressive association
largely because that issue has not yet arisen in a case before the Court.").
9. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations
and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1497-98 (2001); Jason Mazzone, Freedom's
Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 679 (2002).
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association cases like Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,"0 Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte," and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale2
do not say much, outside of their own examples, about how to determine
what is and what is not an expressive association.3
Not only did FAIR not help matters in this regard, it made matters
worse by proceeding on the assumption that public employers, in the guise
of FAIR's public law school members, 4 have expressive association rights. 5
The Court came to this conclusion without any analysis. 6 Instead, it should
have considered that law schools may be expressive associations for certain
limited purposes, but not for others, and that private and public law schools
should be treated differently given the constitutional issues at stake.
As it turns out, this oversight did not impact the decision in FAIR
itself, because, even though the law schools were expressive associations, the
Court found that the requirement of equal access for military recruiters on
law school campuses did not unconstitutionally burden the schools' expres-
sive association rights.'7 The future consequences could be far reaching,
however, if public employers generally are considered to have First Amendment
rights to expressive association. This could mean that public employers
would gain constitutional rights at the expense of public employees' civil
liberties and civil rights.'9
10. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
11. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
12. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
13. See Farber, supra note 9, at 1498 ("So far, the Court has given us a series of examples
without any defining principle."); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private
Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 215 (2003) ("[Olne looks in vain to [Boy Scouts of America
v.1 Dale for some persuasive, principled, or even predictable limit on the First Amendment
protections enjoyed by associations."); Mazzone, supra note 9, at 680 ("As the doctrine of freedom
of association has developed the examples are all the rules we have.").
14. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR) includes law schools as
institutions and law school faculties, but both are treated collectively as "law schools" in Rumsfeld
v. FAIR. See 547 U.S. 47, 52, 69-70 (2006). Of the known members of the association, four are
public law school faculties. See infra notes 35, 75 and accompanying text.
15. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68-70; see also Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("One indication
that the lower courts [in FAIR] paid insufficient attention to this [expressive association] element
is their failure to consider state law schools as members of FAIR."). Perhaps because the
government conceded the point about FAIR members being expressive associations, the Court did
not consider the potential ramifications of characterizing public law schools in such a manner.
See infra Part I.C.
16. The actual language used by the Court concerning whether FAIR constitutes an
expressive association is discussed in detail in Part I.C.
17. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68-70.
18. This outcome is a distinct possibility since public law schools can equally exercise these
expressive association rights in the employment context. See infra Part III.A.
19. See infra Parts III.B, III.C.
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Fortunately, it is hard to imagine that the Court, if faced with the
question directly, would find that public employers have First Amendment
rights of any kind. This interpretation of the First Amendment is
structurally unsound because the Bill of Rights protects the governed, not
the governing." To the extent that public employers have interests in promot-
ing messages consistent with their public mission and image, it is better to
conceive of these interests as the same as those discussed in the Pickering v.
Board of Education line of cases.21 These cases concern the need for govern-
mental efficiency and lack of disruption in the public employment sector
even in light of public employee First Amendment rights.22 To keep these
governmental efficiency interests within reasonable bounds, however, the
government speech doctrine discussed in Garcetti v. CebaUos should be limited
to those public employees who are specifically hired to promote the govern-
ment's message and not to all employees who engage in conduct pursuant
to their job duties. 3
The purpose of this Article, then, is to point out an inadvertent error
that the Court made in FAIR on its way to doing the heavy analytical
lifting. By failing to methodically analyze whether all constituents of the
FAIR organization are expressive associations, the Court erroneously
implied that both public and private law schools may be expressive
associations. A careful unpacking of the rationale in FAIR will permit this
judicial misstep to be corrected before the recognition of public employer
expressive associations causes substantial harm to civil liberties and civil
rights in the workplace. This Article also hopes to fashion a coherent
constitutional analysis in public employment law cases by using the
Pickering framework and limiting the application of the Garcetti government
speech doctrine. This analysis discards the notion that the government
20. This is not to say that the U.S. Supreme Court has not extended constitutional rights
to states in other contexts, especially in situations in which state and federal sovereign interests
collide. David Fagundes has cogently argued that "in cases where private individuals are not
involved and the dispute centers on the federal government's attempt to restrict the speech of
another sovereign," constitutional rights for state actors should be recognized. See David
Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2006). This
Article, however, does not deal with such federal-state conflicts and, instead, concentrates on
public employment cases involving private individuals' interactions with their government
employers. In such instances, this Article argues, the U.S. Constitution should "function[]
primarily as a bulwark against government abuse," id., and should not be available for state actors
to use offensively against contrary public employee constitutional and statutory rights. See infra
Part IV.A.
21. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
22. See infra Part IV.B.1.
23. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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employer has a constitutional right as an expressive association to disassoci-
ate itself from those it deems are promoting an antithetical message, focusing
instead on whether the constitutional right of the public employee can be
recognized without substantially disrupting the public employer's enterprise.
This Article discusses in four Parts the Supreme Court's recognition of
public employer expressive associations and how the Court should rectify
this state of affairs, consistent with the protection of public employee civil
liberties and civil rights. Part I explores in depth the Court's decision in
FAIR, with a focus on the Court's expressive association analysis. Part II
then examines the historically elusive meaning of which groups constitute
expressive associations under Supreme Court precedent, explaining how
this lack of clarity contributed to the recognition of public employer expres-
sive associations in FAIR. Next, Part III outlines the potentially detrimental
consequences to public employees of this unintended constitutional develop-
ment and provides examples to illustrate what recognition of these public
expressive associations would mean to public employees' civil rights and
civil liberties. Part IV concludes by arguing that the Court will eventually
undo this mistake by relying on structural arguments about the Bill of
Rights, but urges the Court to use this opportunity to fashion a workable
framework for balancing public employer efficiency interests against public
employee constitutional rights by utilizing the durable Pickering balancing
test. At the same time, the Article maintains that the Court should modify
its Garcetti holding so that public employee constitutional rights are not
needlessly sacrificed through an overblown application of the government
speech doctrine.
I. RUMSFELD v. FAIR
A. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and the Solomon Amendment
The First Amendment case of Rumsfeld v. FAIR24 stems from a legisla-
tive compromise concerning the inclusion of homosexual individuals in the
military.25 Whereas previously the military had more actively sought to
exclude homosexual members from the armed services,26 the new "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) policy shielded homosexuals from being dismissed
24. 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
25. See Morriss, supra note 8, at 434 (citing Eugene R. Milhizer, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell": A
Qualified Defense, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 349, 351-66 (2004)) (discussing the history
surrounding the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT) policy).
26. See id.
54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1767 (2007)1772
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from service as long as they did not engage in homosexual acts, state that
they were homosexuals, or marry a person of the same sex.27 Despite challenges
by gay rights activists," the DADT policy remains in effect, and federal
appellate and districts courts have consistently found it to be constitutional. 9
A number of law schools, in solidarity with opponents of DADT,
began restricting military recruiters' access to their campuses. ° The schools'
opposition to DADT was based on their own nondiscrimination policies
that, among other things, prohibit recruiters from engaging in sexual
orientation discrimination.3t In response, the U.S. Congress enacted the
Solomon Amendment, which prevents colleges and universities from
receiving certain federal funding32 if they prohibit military recruiters "from
gaining access to campuses, or access to students ... on campuses, for
purposes of military recruiting in a manner that is at least equal in quality
and scope to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to
any other employer."
A number of law schools believed that the Solomon Amendment
required them to choose between abandoning their nondiscrimination
27. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000).
28. For instance, the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network is currently mounting its
fifth annual campaign to persuade the U.S. Congress to repeal the DADT policy and allow
homosexuals to serve openly in the armed services. See Servicemembers Legal Defense Network,
Lobby Day 2007, http://gal.org/sldn/events/lobbyday07/details.tcl (last visited Jan. 7, 2007) (providing
information for group lobbying efforts to repeal DADT in Washington, D.C., in March 2007).
29. See Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l
Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997). The policy is being challenged today on different constitu-
tional grounds in light of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), but still without success. See
Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass. 2006) (dismissing a challenge to the DADT
policy on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim).
30. See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47,51 (2006).
31. ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCH., INC., BYLAWS AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE REGULATIONS
PERTAINING TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF MEMBERSHIP, at Bylaw § 6-3(b), Exec. Comm. Regulation
§ 6-3.2 (2005), available at http://www.aals.org/about-handbook-requirements.php#6.
32. Although student financial assistance is not covered by the law, federal funding from
the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Transportation, Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education, among other agencies, may be lost at the university-wide level if schools
do not comply with the Solomon Amendment. See 10 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1), (2) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
33. Id. § 983(b) (Supp. 2004). In its first iteration, the Solomon Amendment withdrew
federal funds from higher education institutions that prevented military recruiters "from gaining
entry to campuses." However, the Department of Defense later adopted an informal policy that
"entry to campus" meant that universities had to "provide military recruiters access to [their] students
equal in quality and scope [as] that provided to other recruiters." See FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 283 (D.N.J. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). This equal access requirement was
formally codified by Congress in the Solomon Amendment in 2004 as a result of litigation of this
matter in the lower federal courts. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911-12 (2004).
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policies and losing a substantial amount of federal funding.34 A group of
public and private law schools and faculties, called the Forum for Academic
and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR)," sued for a preliminary injunction
against enforcement of the law, arguing that it impermissibly infringed on
their First Amendment rights of speech and association. 6
B. Rumsfeld v. FAIR
The Supreme Court unanimously" found that the Solomon
Amendment did not infringe the FAIR law schools' freedoms of speech and
association under the First Amendment.38 The Court's opinion can be
divided into two parts: (1) statutory; and (2) constitutional.
1. The Statutory Argument
The first part of the FAIR decision considered whether the case could
be disposed of on statutory grounds as proposed by a brief filed by law
professor amici. These professors believed that the equal access require-
ment of the Solomon Amendment could be read to allow law schools to
apply a general nondiscrimination policy to exclude military recruiters. In
other words, as long as law schools excluded other recruiters that violated
their nondiscrimination policies, it could treat military recruiters in the
same fashion)0
34. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 52.
35. The declared mission of FAIR is "to promote academic freedom, support educational
institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate the rights of institutions of higher
education." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). According to SolomonResponse.org, FAIR
consists of thirty-six participating law schools, including twenty-four faculties and twelve institutions.
See SolomonResponse.org, FAIR Participating Law Schools, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
solomon/participating-schools.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2007). Of these, only twenty-four are
publicly known, as the remaining members have chosen to remain anonymous for fear of
retaliation from the government and private actors. See FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
36. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 52-53.
37. Justice Alito did not participate in the case, so FAIR was actually an 8-0 decision. See
id. at 50.
38. Id. at 70. The Supreme Court came to this conclusion after the district court found in
favor of the government, see FAIR, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, and the Third Circuit reversed in a
divided opinion, see FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004).
39. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 55-56 (citing Brief for Professors William Alford et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10-18, FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152); Brief for 56
Columbia Law School Faculty Members as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents and Supporting
Affirmance at 6-15, FAIR, 547 U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152)).
40. Id. at 56.
1774
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As an initial matter, both the government and FAIR did not believe
this to be the meaning of the equal access requirement of the Solomon
Amendment. Both read the statue to say that for a law school and its univer-
sity to receive federal funding, the same access must be afforded to campus
and students by military recruiters as that received by other nonmilitary
recruiters." The Court agreed, finding that the proper focus of the statute
was not on the "content of a school's recruiting policy," but the "result
achieved by the policy." 2 Military recruiters must be given the same level
of access to law schools as other recruiters who comply with the law
schools' nondiscrimination policies.43
2. The Constitutional Arguments
After rejecting the statutory argument, the Court considered whether
the First Amendment prevented the government from imposing the Solomon
Amendment access requirements on law schools. Chief Justice Roberts
began with the proposition that Congress has great latitude in enacting
legislation to raise and support armies;" requiring campus access for military
recruiters falls under that power unless the legislative branch exceeds other
constitutional limitations, such as those imposed by the First Amendment.45
The Third Circuit, in finding for FAIR, had concluded that the condi-
tions placed on university federal funding amounted to an impermissible
unconstitutional condition and therefore exceeded the constitutional
limitations on Congress's power to raise and support armies.46 In reversing,
the Supreme Court concluded that "a funding condition [is not] uncon-
stitutional if it [can] be constitutionally imposed directly" 7 and determined
that the access requirement did not violate the law schools' First
Amendment rights to free speech or association. 4
41. Id. at 55.
42. Id. at 57.
43. Id.
44. Congress has the power to "provide for the common Defence ... [tlo raise and support
Armies," and "[to provide and maintain a Navy," under Article I of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. When Congress acts pursuant to these powers, "judicial deference ... is
at its apogee." Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981).
45. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 58.
46. See id. at 54 (citing FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 229-43 (3d Cit. 2004)). Under
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, "the government may not deny a benefit to a person
on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech even if he has no
entitlement to that benefit." Id. at 59 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United
States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 210 (2003)).
47. Id. at 59-60 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
48. Id. at 70.
1775
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a. Free Speech Arguments
In determining that the access requirement did not violate the law
schools' First Amendment rights, the Court first explored three different
constitutional free speech arguments.49 FAIR argued that the Solomon
Amendment compelled them to "speak the Government's message," required
them to "host or accommodate the military's speech," and "unconstitutionally
infring[ed] [on their] right to engage in expressive conduct."5 The Court
rejected all three claims, finding generally that the Solomon Amendment
did not require the FAIR schools to say or do anything." More specifically,
there was no government-mandated pledge or motto that the law schools
had to endorse, as in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette52 and
Wooley v. Maynard;53 no requirement that the law schools accommodate a
government message that interfered with the law schools' desired message,
as in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc. ,
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California," and
49. Because the free speech contentions in FAIR are not central to the argument in this
Article, I provide only a cursory overview of these arguments and their resolution by the Court.
The Court also rejected a fourth argument, adopted by the Third Circuit, that "the Solomon
Amendment violated the First Amendment because it compelled law schools to subsidize
[government] speech." See id. at 1307 n.4. In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550
(2005), the Court made clear that citizens do not have a "First Amendment right not to fund
government speech." Id. at 562. Thus, the FAIR Court found no basis for a First Amendment
challenge on these grounds. 547 U.S. at 61 n.4.
50. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 60-61.
51. Id. at 61.
52. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding unconstitutional a state law that required school
children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in school).
53. 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a state law that made it a crime for
New Hampshire motorists to obscure the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on their automobiles'
license plates).
54. 515 U.S. 557, 566 (1995) (holding unconstitutional a state law requiring a parade to
include a group with a message antithetical to those of the parade organizers). With regard to
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., the Court concluded that
unlike the decision surrounding who participates in a parade, allowing military recruiters on law
school campuses is not inherently expressive and does not sufficiently interfere with any message
the law school wishes to send. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 63-64. But see Dale Carpenter, Unanimously
Wrong, 2005-2006 CATO SUP. Cr. REV. 217, 240 (2006) ("[Tlhe Court's conclusion betrays how
little it appreciates the important expressive nature of antidiscrimination policies that embody a
school's commitment to its vision of morality, ethical conduct, and professionalism. Perhaps the
government has non-speech-related interests sufficient to override these expressive interests,
but to deny that the expressive interests are even present is blindness.").
55. 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding unconstitutional a public utility
commission's order that required the state utility commission to place a third-party newsletter in
an electric company's billing envelopes).
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1776 2006-2007
Expressive Associations in Public Employment 1777
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo; 6 and no conduct that amounted to
expressive conduct, as in Texas v. Johnson.
5 7
b. Associational Arguments
Having determined that the Solomon Amendment did not violate the
law schools' freedom of speech, the Court next turned to whether the law
violated the schools' rights to expressive association as outlined in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale."8 FAIR argued that the Amendment violated the
law schools' rights to expressive association by inhibiting their ability to
express their message that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
is wrong by forcing them to allow military recruiters on their campuses."
As outlined in Dale and other expressive association cases, such claims
require that three elements be established: (1) The group is an expressive
association; (2) forced inclusion of outsiders would significantly affect the
group's expression; and (3) the government's interests do not justify this
intrusion." In FAIR, the Court focused on the second element; it completely
ignored the first and found it unnecessary to reach the third.
56. 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a right-of-reply state statute that
violated a newspaper's right to determine the content of its publication).
57. 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (holding that burning an American flag was expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment). Even if the test set forth in United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), were applicable to the expressive conduct in FAIR, the Court concluded in
the alternative that the Solomon Amendment was a "neutral regulation [that promoted] a substantial
governmental interest" (for instance, raising and supporting armies) "that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulation." See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
58. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Although neither the right to expressive association, nor any
other type of association, is found within the text of the First Amendment, see U.S. CONST.
amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."), the
Court has nevertheless implicitly found such a right in the Constitution, see Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ("[Wle have long understood as implicit in the right to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends."). Erwin Chemerinsky explains more practically that because groups have resources in
human capital and money, such groups enhance an individual's freedom to engage in protected
constitutional activities. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1155 (3d ed. 2006); see also Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination
Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515, 1519 (2001) ("[The First
Amendment's] chief value may be the role it plays in protecting people who want to combine
with others to promote common causes.").
59. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 68.
60. Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-59.
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Proceeding on the assumption that the FAIR law schools were an
expressive association,61 the Court concluded that the Solomon Amendment
did not significantly burden the schools' associational rights and thus, there
was no need to justify the government's intrusion on those rights.62 More
specifically, the Court concluded that although law schools associate to
some extent with military recruiters, these same recruiters do not come to
campus seeking to "become members of the school's expressive association." 63
Moreover, even though the right to "expressive association protects more
than just membership decisions," the Solomon Amendment does not make
group membership in the law schools less attractive, since law school
"[s]tudents and faculty are free to ... voice their disapproval of the
military's" DADT policy while the recruiters are on campus.
64
The Court concluded that the Solomon Amendment did not violate
the FAIR law schools' association rights. Instead, the Court found that FAIR
had "attempted to stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines well
beyond the sort of activities these doctrines protect."65
C. The Missing Expressive Association Analysis
The Court is actually the one who seems to have unwittingly
stretched one First Amendment doctrine too far by failing to analyze
whether all members of FAIR, including its state law school members,
should have expressive association rights.' With regard to whether the
law school members of FAIR are expressive associations, the Court only
stated the following:
The Solomon Amendment, however, does not similarly affect a law
school's associational rights.67
61. The missing part of the FAIR Court's expressive association analysis is discussed in
detail in Part I.C.
62. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 69-70.
63. Id. at 69 In other words, there is no expressive association violation because "the Solomon
Amendment does not force a law school 'to accept members it does not desire."' Id. (quoting Dale, 530
U.S. at 648).
64. Id. at 69-70 ("A military recruiter's mere presence on campus does not violate a law
school's right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message.").
65. Id. at 70.
66. See Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("One indication that the lower courts [in FAIR] paid
insufficient attention to this [expressive association] element is their failure to consider state law
schools as members of FAIR.").
67. FAIR, 547 U.S. at 69.
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Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the
limited purpose of trying to hire students-not to become members
of the school's expressive association. 68
The Solomon Amendment has no similar effect on a law school's
associational rights.69
The Solomon Amendment therefore does not violate a law school's
First Amendment rights. A military recruiter's mere presence on campus
does not violate a law school's right to associate, regardless of how
repugnant the law school considers the recruiter's message.' °
Note that in all of these passages the Court is not assuming for the sake of
argument that the law schools in FAIR are expressive associations; it is
saying the law schools are expressive associations and doing so with a glaring
absence of any analysis]'
Why might the Court have made this assumption?" This is necessarily
speculation, but since the government did not contest the point that the
law schools qualified as expressive associations, the Court apparently did
not think this issue worthy of any mention." It also might be that the
Court did not want to distinguish between the public and private law school
members of FAIR because it would have required an additional, and
potentially difficult, analysis that was not necessary to decide the case.
So, what's the big deal? After all, FAIR lost the case. No harm, no




71. Accord Fagundes, supra note 20, at 1685 (noting in FAIR that, "[alithough the Court
did not explicitly address the issue of state actors' First Amendment rights, its decision proceeded
on the premise that both public and private universities possess constitutional speech rights");
see also Morriss, supra note 8, at 416 (arguing that "the Third Circuit [in FAIR] improperly
treated the law schools and [their] faculties as [worthy ofl associational freedom claims").
72. The Court did not miss this significant issue because no one briefed it. Indeed,
Andrew Morriss makes quite clear that a number of law professor and law student amici in favor
of the Solomon Amendment pointed out the troubling implications surrounding the fact that
FAIR included state law schools. See Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("One indication that the
lower courts paid insufficient attention to this element is their failure to consider state law schools
as members of FAIR. These schools, as instrumentalities of state governments, have no First
Amendment rights." (citing Brief for Law Professors and Law Students as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 544 U.S. 1017 (2005) (No. 04-1152))).
73. Dale Carpenter comments: "While one scholar pre-FAIR questioned whether law
schools qualified as expressive associations, the government did not contest this issue and the
Court was not detained by it." Carpenter, supra note 54, at 249 (citing Morriss, supra note 8). If
that was the case, it is hard to understand why the Court did not at least drop a succinct footnote
indicating that it agreed that all of the law schools were expressive associations.
1779Expressive Associations in Public Employment
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that public law schools, as members of FAIR, have expressive association
rights. In fact, of the known FAIR members, 4 four are public law school
faculties: the faculty of the City University of New York (CUNY) School of
Law, the faculty of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law,
the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School, and the faculty
of the University of Puerto Rico Law School. 5 The Court did not distin-
guish between institutional membership and faculty membership in the
FAIR organization, 6 suggesting that recognition of FAIR law school faculties
as expressive associations is tantamount to recognizing public law schools as
expressive associations for purposes of First Amendment analysis.7
Although the Court found in FAIR that the Solomon Amendment did
not significantly burden the law schools' expressive association rights, it is
possible that public law schools and other public employers could argue in
future cases that their expressive association rights permit them to not
accept employee members they do not desire. 8 Indeed, the FAIR Court's
expressive association analysis hinged to a large degree on the critical point
that military recruiters were not seeking to become "members of the schools'
expressive association." 9 On the other hand, potential faculty and staff do
seek to become members of the school. FAIR, consistent with Dale,
suggests that expressive association rights give a group the ability to reject
members it does not want.8°
74. As discussed previously, a number of the members of the FAIR association choose to
remain anonymous. See supra note 35.
75. See SolomonResponse.org, supra note 35.
76. See supra note 14.
77. Accord Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 185 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding that the Yale
Law School (YLS) faculty members may successfully assert an expressive association claim on behalf
of the YLS in another challenge to the Solomon Amendment). Interestingly, in the Burt case, the
Department of Defense defended on the ground that "Yale University, not the Faculty, is the proper
party to bring these claims," id. at 160, but the court found that the faculty members were "the
governing body of YLS," id.; see also Burt v. Rumsfeld, 322 F. Supp. 2d 189, 199-200 (D. Conn. 2004)
(rejecting the Department of Defense's claim that the YLS faculty lacked standing). Thus, whether law
faculties may be able to assert an expressive association claim on behalf of their law schools may depend
on whether they establish the rules, by majority, that govern and regulate their law school. See aLso
Morriss, supra note 8, at 452 n.161 (discussing the membership of FAIR and commenting that "[ilt is
unclear what distinction is intended by the description of 'about half' of FAIR's members as 'law schools'
and the other half as 'law faculties.' It may indicate something about the official position of the dean").
78. For a discussion of the implication of public employer expressive associations on
employee civil rights and civil liberties, see infra Parts III.B, III.C.
79. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006).
80. Id.; Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). Nor is there anything in past
Supreme Court precedent to suggest that employers per se cannot be expressive associations. In fact,
the Court in Hishon v. King & Spalding implied just the opposite. 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (implying
employers have rights to association for certain purposes, such as when they make distinctive contribu-
tions to society's ideas and beliefs). For a more in-depth examination of Hishon, see infra Part II.A.3.
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To explain how the Court arrived at this unintended state of affairs,
the next Part explores how previous expressive association cases provided
little clue, beyond their own examples, as to the definition of an expressive
association. This brief review will clarify how the FAIR Court could have
overlooked this significant constitutional issue.81
1I. THE HISTORICALLY ELUSIVE MEANING
OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
A. Historical Foundations (1958-1984)
1. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson
The development of expressive association rights closely mirrors the
progress of the civil rights movement of the second half of the twentieth
century. In the 1958 decision NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,2 the
Supreme Court first noted that the ability to associate was an "inseparable
aspect" of being able to fully exercise one's constitutional rights, especially
those protected by the First Amendment. 3
In Patterson, Alabama sought the production of documents including
the name and addresses of all National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) members in a transparent attempt to oust the
NAACP from the state.84 The Court unanimously found that Alabama
could not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership lists consistent
with its members' rights to associate with others to promote their common
integrationist views."5 Outing the NAACP members would make membership
81. The unanimous nature of the FAIR holding may have made this inadvertent error
more likely because such decisions are not put through the fire of an adversarial process.
Compromise is the norm in such cases, which makes it less likely that the Court will go out of its
way to tackle potentially divisive issues. See Saul Brenner et al., Fluidity and Coalition Sizes on the
Supreme Court, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 245, 253 (1996) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court is similar to other
small groups in which casting a unanimous vote tends to bury the arguments on the other side.").
82. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
83. Id. at 460. Other commentators have commenced their historical exploration of the
expressive association right with earlier cases. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1520-22
(starting expressive association analysis with cases surrounding Espionage Act of 1917); David
McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121, 126 (2001) (beginning historical
analysis of expressive association right with the Court's opinion in United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875)). Although there are plausible reasons to start the historical analysis at other
places, I start with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson because it represents the first time that
the Supreme Court explicitly recognized a First Amendment right to freedom of association.
84. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453.
85. Id. at 466.
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in the group less attractive, thereby putting a substantial restraint on the
members' freedom to associate for a common cause.86
The discussion of the right to associate in Patterson assumes the right
to associate belongs to the members of the group, not to the group itself.87
Because there was no argument in this case that the NAACP itself had a
right to association as an entity, the Court did not need to explain what
groups constitute constitutionally protected associations.
2. NAACP v. Button
NAACP v. Buttonss concerned whether Virginia could prevent the
NAACP from recruiting parents to participate in desegregation cases.8 9
The Supreme Court again held in favor of the NAACP, finding that its
activities were types of "expression and association protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. ' This time, however, the Court recognized
that organizations, separate and apart from their members, possess rights to
associate for the purposes of advocacy."
Perhaps because the NAACP was an expressive association par excel-
lence, the Court did not undertake an independent analysis to determine
if the nature of the group was sufficiently expressive to qualify for First
Amendment protection. In any event, after Button, there was still no
indication of how to determine which groups have associational freedoms
under the First Amendment.
86. Id. at 462 ("Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances
be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs.").
87. Id. (referring to the associational rights at issue in Patterson as members' rights to
freedom of association); see also id. at 466 (commenting that the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) claimed rights to association on behalf of its members).
88. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
89. Id. at 421.
90. Id. at 428-29.
91. See id. at 428 ("We think [the NAACP] may assert this right on its own behalf, because,
though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities, claimed to be constitutionally
protected, which the [Virginia] statue would curtail." (emphasis added) (citing Grosjean v. Am.
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936))). Grosjean held that "a corporation is a 'person' within the
meaning of the equal protection and due process of law clauses." 297 U.S. at 244 (citing Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898); Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S.
578, 592 (1896)).
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3. Hishon v. King & Spalding
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving racially
discriminatory private schools and their rights to association.92 In both cases,
private schools were again assumed, without analysis, to constitute associa-
tions for constitutional purposes. However, in 1984, the Court considered a
question that had not been addressed before: whether private employers
could be considered associations due constitutional protection.
Hishon v. King & Spalding'3 concerned a law firm partnership decision
that was allegedly based on unlawful gender discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9' On the Title VII issue in conten-
tion, the Court found that such partnership decisions were rightly
considered a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and therefore, a
covered employment decision under Title VII.95 One of the arguments
against this finding was that such an interpretation of Title VII would
unconstitutionally interfere with the law firm's right to association by
requiring it to invite unwanted members into its partnership ranks.96
The Court rejected this argument. While conceding that employers
and their member employees could have rights to association for certain
purposes, such as employees making "'distinctive contribution[s] ... to the
ideas and beliefs of ... society' (as did the NAACP), 97 the Court held
that such rights do not exist when the employment decision by the associa-
tion does not implicate these loftier goals.9 In other words, some employers
are expressive associations for limited purposes, and some employers are not
expressive associations at all to the extent that they do not engage in a
substantial amount of expressive activity.99
92. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (finding that a federal civil rights law
prohibited racially discriminatory admission practices at private schools, even assuming schools
had associational rights); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding a Mississippi textbook
loan program unconstitutional in lending textbooks to students in racially discriminatory pri-
vate schools, and finding that the state need not subsidize a more effective exercise of the private
school's right to association).
93. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
94. Id. at 71-72 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000)).
95. Id. at 77-78.
96. Id. at 78.
97. See id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)).
98. Id.; see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 637 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("[OGrdinary law practice for commercial ends has never been given special First Amendment
protection.... We emphasized this point only this Term in Hishon v. King & Spalding .... ").
99. See Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1577 (maintaining that schools might have
expressive association rights in the employment context when the employees are central to
the expressive activities of the schools).
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B. The Recent Cases (1984-2006)
1. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees
Six weeks after Hishon, the landmark case of Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees'"
broke new ground in freedom of association cases by introducing an instruc-
tive dichotomy. The right to intimate association concerns rights to
personal liberty located within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."°' The right to expressive association, on the other hand,
involves association for the promotion of rights found primarily within the
First Amendment. 2 The "nature and degree of constitutional protection"
depends on the type of association in which a group engages.103
In Roberts, the state interference at issue involved the application of
Minnesota's state public accommodations statute's gender discrimination provi-
sions to the membership policies of the Jaycees, which did not grant women
full membership in their organization.'" The Court first explained that the
Jaycees was not an intimate association because of its size, lack of selectivity
in defining group membership, and its generally open, public nature.'0 5
Having eliminated intimate association from consideration, the Court
recognized the Jaycees as a type of expressive association whose members
affiliated with one another to advocate certain views. 6 However, the
analysis of why the Jaycees is an expressive organization turned very much
on the specific facts of the case. After making the broad statement that "we
have long understood as implicit in the right to engage in activities protected
by the First Amendment a corresponding right to associate with others in
pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends,"'07 the Court concluded that "[iun view of the various pro-
tected activities which the Jaycees engages ... that right is plainly implicated
100. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
101. Id. at 617-18.
102. Id. at 618.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 612-17.
105. Id. at 620-21. Not surprisingly, the Court also found employers do not have rights of
intimate association when selecting employees. See id. at 620 ("[T]he Constitution undoubtedly
imposes constraints on the State's power to control the selection of one's spouse that would not
apply to regulations affecting the choice of one's fellow employees.").
106. Id. at 622. Even though the Court concluded that the Jaycees had expressive associa-
tion rights and that those rights were significantly burdened by the application of the public
accommodation statute, see id. at 623, the Court nevertheless held that the state's compelling
interest in eradicating gender discrimination justified the infringement on the group's rights, id.
107. Id. at 622.
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in this case."' 8  In turn, the Jaycees' activities are described later in the
opinion as taking public positions on a number of diverse issues and regularly
engaging "in a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other
activities worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amendment."'"
Thus, in its first foray into describing which groups constitute expressive
associations for First Amendment purposes, the Court offered an example of
an expressive association without any defining or limiting principles." 0
In contrast to Justice Brennan's dichotomy for the majority, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts suggested that nonintimate association
cases should be further broken down into expressive association and commer-
cial association cases. Her analysis would accord sufficient protection to
expressive associations while placing appropriate burdens on groups claiming
the protection of the First Amendment for commercial association purposes."'
Whereas those associations that were predominantly expressive were due
substantial protection from governmental interference, Justice O'Connor
argued that commercial associations were largely nonexpressive and,
therefore, state regulation was permissible as long as it was rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose."2 Indeed, this is how Justice O'Connor
characterized the Hishon decision: as nothing more than a large law firm
engaging in commercial associations lacking expressive content."
Furthermore, she suggested that most employment decisions are part of a
commercial association, which can be regulated by states without impinging
upon any constitutional right to association.'
Based on these "radically different constitutional protections for expressive
and nonexpressive associations,""' '. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judg-
ment of the Court that the Jaycees could not rely on an expressive association
108. Id.
109. Id. at 626-27.
110. See Hills, supra note 13, at 215-17; McGowan, supra note 83, at 132.
111. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor recognized that "[miany associations cannot readily be described as purely expressive or
purely commercial" and that "Itihe standard for deciding just how much of an association's
involvement in commercial activity is enough to suspend the association's First Amendment right
to control its membership cannot ... be articulated with simple precision." Id. at 635.
112. Id. at 633-35.
113. Id. at 637.
114. Id. at 634 ("The Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees ... or
those with whom one engages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the
State."). In this regard, Justice O'Connor maintained: "An association must choose its market.
Once it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the complete
control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace
of ideas." Id. at 636.
115. Id. at 638.
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right to immunize themselves from the application of the Minnesota public
accommodations statute."6 Unlike the majority, however, she found that the
Jaycees primarily "promote[ I and practice[ ] the art of solicitation and
management,' '. a distinct commercial enterprise, and therefore are subject
to state regulation that meets low-level rational basis review.'
Justice O'Connor thus provided a more systematic approach to deter-
mine which groups constitute expressive associations, especially in the
commercial-employment arena."9 Her analysis was more rigorous than
Justice Brennan's "I know it when I see it" approach. Nevertheless, in the
twenty-three years since Roberts, the Supreme Court has not made any
move to adopt Justice O'Connor's commercial association test.'20 Perhaps if
it had, much of the potential for mischief caused by the FAIR decision's
recognition of public employer expressive associations would have been
avoided, since under her model, most public employers would be considered
commercial associations due limited constitutional protection.121
2. Pre-Dale Cases: Rotary Club of Duarte, New York State Club Ass'n,
and Stanglin
After Roberts, the Court decided Board of Directors of Rotary International
v. Rotary Club of Duarte2 ' and New York State Club Ass'n v. City of
116. Id. at 640.
117. Id. at 639.
118. Id.
119. Accord Farber, supra note 9, at 1498 ("The most serious effort to explain and justify the
special treatment for expressive associations is found in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts.");
see also Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1517-18 (extending O'Connor's Roberts concurrence and
arguing for a tripartite approach that treats associations differently depending on the predomi-
nance of the protected expression in their activities).
120. See Julie Manning Magid & Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Religious and Associational
Freedoms of Business Owners, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191, 218 (2005) ("Justice O'Connor's
well-reasoned concurrence in Roberts... wields less persuasive authority after Dale failed to recognize
its commercial associations and expressive associations dichotomy." (footnote omitted)). But see
Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1564 (arguing that although the Court has never adopted Justice
O'Connor's commercial association test, subsequent cases can readily be explained by reference to
that framework).
121. Accord Carpenter, supra note 54, at 249 ("If the Court had rejected the freedom of
association claim on the ground that recruiting is a commercial activity not protected by the
freedom of association, it would have been a defensible interpretation and application of its
precedents. Instead, the Court ventured into new territory."). But see Hills, supra note 13, at 217
("The difficulty with Justice O'Connor's theory... is that it places unsupportable weight on the
distinction between commercial and noncommercial organizations.").
122. 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that the application of the California Unruh Act, which
required California Rotary Clubs to admit women into membership, did not interfere with expressive
association rights of clubs).
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New York,' both of which followed a case-specific expressive association
analysis. Like Roberts, these two cases came out in favor of the government's
right to regulate associations, notwithstanding the expressive association
rights held by some of these groups.'24
With regard to whether the groups at issue qualified as expressive
associations, however, the Court again failed to provide a concrete framework
for this constitutional inquiry. In Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court
concluded that the Rotary Club engaged in expressive activities that were
"quite limited,"'' 5 but nevertheless found that the Club implicitly constituted
an expressive association.'26 Similarly, in New York State Club Ass'n, the
Court sidestepped the question of which groups are expressive associations
and unhelpfully declared that the local New York public accommodations
law does not infringe "the ability of individuals to form associations that
will advocate public or private viewpoints. It does not require the clubs 'to
abandon or alter' any activities that are protected by the First Amendment."'22
The third and less-known case from this time period, City of Dallas
v. Stanglin,' provides some much-needed insight into at least the negative
dimension of the question: which groups do not constitute expressive asso-
ciations. In Stanglin, the "city of Dallas adopted an ordinance restricting
admission to [specified] dance halls to persons between the ages of fourteen
and eighteen."'2 9 The state court of appeals found that the ordinance vio-
lated the right of teenagers to associate with those outside of their age
group.' The Supreme Court reversed, finding that no expressive association
existed among the dance hall patrons."
Specifically, the Court found that the interest of teenagers and adults
in interacting together in a dance hall environment was associational in
some respects but did not "involve the sort of expressive association that
123. 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (holding that the New York City public accommodations law did not
violate the expressive association rights of private clubs engaged in substantial commercial activity).
124. Id. at 13-14; Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548-49.
125. See Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545 n.4. As an example, "Rotary Clubs do not
take positions on 'public questions' like the Jaycees do. See id. at 548.
126. Actually, the Court in Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte
never came out and said expressly that Rotary Clubs, whose "basic goals [are] humanitarian
service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace," are expressive associations,
but merely implies it by finding that although "Rotary Clubs do not take positions on 'public
questions,' including political or international issues," they "engage in a variety of commendable
service activities that are protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 548.
127. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13 (internal citation omitted).
128. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
129. Id. at 20.
130. Id. at 20-21.
131. Id. at 25.
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the First Amendment has been held to protect.',3 2 The Court clarified that
merely being patrons of the same business establishment does not qualify a
group as an expressive association. Instead, the group must "take [a] position[ I
on public questions"'3 or engage in some of the charitable or civic activities
described in the previous Supreme Court expressive association cases.14
This discussion went further in explaining which groups do not
constitute expressive associations. However, the Court itself recognized the
analytical dilemma surrounding these cases when it observed that "[i]t is
possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes-for example, walking down the street or meeting one's friends
at a shopping mall-but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity
within the protection of the First Amendment." '35 But having made this
observation, the Court summarily concluded, without explanation, that
when patrons of a dance hall engage in recreational dancing, their
association is not protected First Amendment activity.3 6 Thus, Stanglin
offers yet another example by which to analogize subsequent cases, but not
a concrete definition for distinguishing between expressive associations and
nonexpressive associations.
3. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
Unlike Roberts, Rotary Club of Duarte, New York State Club Ass'n, and
Stanglin, the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale137 found in favor of a group
claiming expressive association rights.' In an opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court held that the New Jersey state public accommodations
132. Id. at 24.
133. Id. at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
134. Id. at 24-25. On this point, the Stangfin Court made clear that associations do not
have to engage in politics to benefit from expressive association rights. Id. at 25.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id.
137. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
138. Id. at 659. If one considers expressive association cases chronologically, it could be
argued that Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995), should be discussed next. But, like Justice Stevens, I do not characterize Hurley as an
expressive association case because
Hurley involved the parade organizers' claim to determine the content of the message
they wish to give at a particular time and place. The standards governing such a claim
are simply different from the standards that govern [the Boy Scouts of America]'s claim
of a right of expressive association.... An expressive association claim ... normally
involves the avowal and advocacy of a consistent position on some issue over time.
Dale, 530 U.S. at 696 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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statute impermissibly infringed on the Scouts' expressive association rights by
requiring them to have a gay assistant scoutmaster as a member.39
The Court began its analysis by determining whether the Boy Scouts
engaged in an expressive association and cautioned that "a group must engage
in some form of expression, whether it be public or private."'40 The Court
then examined the record, including the Boy Scouts' mission statement, and
concluded that the Scouts' mission was "to instill values in young people,"
including the values of being "morally straight" and "clean.' 4. The Court
concluded that "[iut seems indisputable that an association that seeks to
transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity.' ' 42 Although
Justice Stevens's dissent took the majority to task for other reasons,' 43 he did
not dispute that the Boy Scouts are an expressive association.
44
The Dale Court thus made clear that initially determining whether
a group constitutes an expressive association is essential to figuring
out whether there have been expressive association violations. 45 Yet,
the opinion still provides no workable framework for making this
determination. 46  The Boy Scouts, like law firms, private schools, social
139. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 657-59. The Court deferred to the group's description of both its
message concerning homosexuality and what would impair that message, and found that the New
Jersey law substantially interfered with the Scouts' expressive association rights by forcing them
to accept a high-profile gay assistant scoutmaster. See id. at 651-53. The Court then concluded
that, given the severity of the intrusion into the rights to expressive association, the Boy Scouts'
First Amendment rights prevailed. See id. at 657-59. These portions of the Dale decision are
discussed in more detail in Part 11.
140. Id. at 648.
141. See id. at 649-50. But see id. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Beyond the single
sentence in these policy statements, there is no indication of any shared goal of teaching that
homosexuality is incompatible with being 'morally straight' and 'clean."').
142. See id. at 650 (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). The Court's formulation that "[ilt seems indisputable" is a rather bizarre way of
concluding that the Boy Scouts qualify as an expressive association, see id., and is wholly
unconvincing when one considers that "the Court itself implicitly disputed [the 'transmits values'
basis] in Runyon v. McCrary when it held that a racist private school had no First Amendment
entitlement to exclude black children from its student body," Hills, supra note 13, at 215 (citing
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976)).
143. See infra Part II1.B.
144. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 665-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Carpenter, supra note 58,
at 1537 ("This is a bigger concession than it first appears because what makes the [Boy Scouts] an
expressive association is not the political causes it pursues. It does not pursue any, in the usual sense.").
145. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
146. Accord Hills, supra note 13, at 215 ("[T'he Dale majority seems to place no meaningful limits
on the definition of 'expressive associations."'); Morriss, supra note 8, at 451 (arguing that the Supreme
Court's Dale-based jurisprudence fails to give much guidance about how to distinguish expressive
associations from nonexpressive associations). Morriss believes this lack of guidance may be due to
the fact that the Court so far has decided easy cases with regard to whether a group constitutes
an expressive association, and "so the examples drawn from the cases leave significant gaps unfilled." Id.
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organizations, and advocacy groups, are expressive associations only
because the Supreme Court tells us so.
4. Post-Dale Third Circuit Opinions
Even with the lack of guidance from previous cases, the Supreme
Court in FAIR had other potential sources for finding a more systematic
way of determining the existence of an expressive association and might
still have avoided its recognition of public law schools as expressive associa-
tions in FAIR. Following the decision in Dale, two Third Circuit decisions,
Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh'47 and Circle School
v. Pappert,'45 tried to fill the gaps left in the Supreme Court's reasoning
about which groups qualify as expressive associations.
49
Pi Lambda Phi considered whether a university fraternity was an
expressive association entitled to protection under the First Amendment
after the university stripped the fraternity of its status as a recognized student
organization as a result of a drug raid at the fraternity house.' Even after
recognizing that the Supreme Court did "not set a very high bar for expres-
sive association," the Third Circuit found the fraternity did not qualify.'
The Third Circuit emphasized that it was not enough to merely say that
the group was a social association; the proper analysis required a more searching
inquiry.' Although there was no prerequisite that the group be political or
even primarily expressive to qualify for constitutional protection,' a "de
minimis threshold" existed' and not "any possible expression" qualified.'
The Third Circuit concluded that the fraternity did not meet this de minimis
threshold because "[niothing in the record indicates the Chapter ever took a
public stance on any issue of public, political, social, or cultural importance."'' 6
147. 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 2000).
148. 381 F.3d 172 (3d Cir. 2004).
149. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of
Pittsburgh put it diplomatically when it observed that the Supreme Court's analysis in Dale of
whether a group is engaging in expressive association was "very succinct." 229 F.3d at 443.
150. See id. at 438-39.
151. Id. at 438.
152. Id. at 442-43.
153. See id. at 443.
154. Id. at 443-44 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (holding that
patrons in the dance hall had not engaged in expressive association)).
155. Id. at 444.
156. Id. The court clarified that fraternities per se were not excluded from being
expressive associations, but that each entity must be considered individually. Id.
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Circle School v. Pappert also examined expressive associations post-Dale.
The court found that the private schools at issue were expressive associa-
tions and their rights were violated by a Pennsylvania law that required
schools to hold recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance or the national
anthem at the beginning of each school day. '57 Judge Sloviter found that,
like the Boy Scouts in Dale, the private schools engaged in "some form of
expression, whether it be public or private."'' s Looking at the record in the
case, the court noted that each of the schools had clear educational
philosophies and goals, including the mission of providing students with
"freedom of choices."'59 In fact, schools, by their very nature, are highly
expressive organizations that inculcate their students with their philosophy
and values.6 Combining an analysis of the type of institution being
examined with a more case-specific exploration of the record, the Third
Circuit concluded that these schools were expressive associations.
61
Pi Lambda Phi and Circle School thus provide a more detailed
framework for the initial expressive association determination. By looking
at the nature of the organization, the purposes for which it is claiming
expressive association rights, and the actual evidence in the record, these
courts were able to come to a more grounded conclusion on the issue.
62
These cases also stand for the proposition that even though the Supreme
Court has "cast a fairly wide net" in defining expressive associations,1 63 a
group "must do more than simply claim to be an expressive association."
'64
Unfortunately, even this basic point did not register on the Supreme
Court's radar in FAIR. The failure of the Court to analyze the expressive
association claim of the FAIR law schools may lead to the unintended
consequences discussed in the next Part.
157. Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cit. 2004).
158. Id. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530
U.S. 640, 648 (2000)).
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. Id. Although the court made this statement in the secondary school context, there is
no indication that the same analysis would not apply in the higher education context.
161. Id. Having thus concluded, the court held that the Pennsylvania pledge law placed a
substantial burden on the schools' expressive association rights without compelling justification
and found a First Amendment violation. See id. at 182-83.
162. This is not to say, however, that these cases provide defining principles, but only that
their analyses are more thorough and well supported than previous Supreme Court decisions in
the expressive association area.
163. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 2000).
164. Id. at 444.
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III. THE DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYER
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS
A. From Military Recruiting to Public Employment
As the discussion in Part I makes clear, the Supreme Court in Rumsfeld
v. FAIR did not adopt the expressive association analysis put forth by the
two Third Circuit opinions, nor did it explicitly follow the three-step
analysis set out by Boy Scouts of America v. Dale. Had the Court taken the
time to consider that law schools may be expressive associations for certain
limited purposes but not for others, and that private and public law schools
should be treated differently for expressive association purposes given the
constitutional issues at stake, it might not have stumbled into this
Serbonian bog.'65
Had the Court considered a case like Circle School v. Pappert, it might
have recognized that although schools are generally highly expressive
organizations, schools can, and do, express themselves in more ways
than just inculcating their students with values." For instance, institutions
of higher education also express themselves by engaging in the four
essential freedoms, as termed by Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence
in Sweezy v. New Hampshire.'67 Arguing for the exclusion of the
government from the intellectual life of the university, Frankfurter
famously quoted a statement of a conference of senior scholars from
South Africa:
It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is
most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an
atmosphere in which there prevail "the four essential freedoms"
165. See John Milton, Paradise Lost, bk. 2, 11. 592-94 (1667), in 1 NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF
LITERATURE 1445, 1481 (M.H. Abrams ed., 5th ed. 1986), quoted in DiFelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 n.1 (3d Cir. 2003) ("A gulf profound as that Serbonian bog /
Betwixt Damiata and Mount Casius old, / Where armies whole have sunk ... ").
166. It is conceivable that the FAIR Court was merely deferring, consistent with Dale, to
FAIR's own assertions concerning the character of its expressive association. See Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000). In its trial brief, FAIR claimed the control over
on-campus law school recruiting was "about the freedom of law schools to shape their own
pedagogical environments and to teach, by word and deed, the values they choose, free from
government intrusion." See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 1, FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cit. 2004) (No. 03-4433); see also FAIR v.
Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 304 (D.N.J. 2003) ("The record reveals that the law
schools ... seek to inculcate a certain set of values and principles in their students."). Yet,
even if one finds this explanation of the Court's expressive association analysis in FAIR
persuasive, it is still not clear why the Court simply did not indicate this in a footnote.
167. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.'6
Each of these freedoms is arguably a type of expression, including the
ability of the university to determine for itself who shall teach.
Consequently, the Court's finding in FAIR is not necessarily limited to
the law schools' advocacy against the DADT policy, but could also be
seen as protecting the schools' faculty hiring decisions.
169
There is, therefore, reason to think that a public law school's
expressive association rights extend to the employment context."'
Indeed, Hishon v. King & Spalding"' suggests that employers who
have expressive purposes may be deemed expressive associations."'
Finally, to recognize that all public employers have expressive
association rights like the Boy Scouts in Dale is simply a matter of
168. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
169. Like other groups and associations, employers may engage in some form of expressive
activity. Cf. Dale, 530 U.S. at 678-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing employers as expres-
sive associations and limits on such associational rights).
170. Although employment relationships are not discussed, the FAIR decision
does indirectly suggest that covered membership decisions might include employment
ones. Cf. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 69-70 (2006) ("The Solomon Amendment has no
similar effect on a law school's associational rights. Students and faculty are free to
associate to voice their approval of the military's message; nothing about the statute
affects the composition of the group by making group membership less desirable.").
Moreover, even prior to the Supreme Court's decision in FAIR, legal arguments
were already being made in the private employment sector that employer expressive
association rights should trump contrary antidiscrimination statutes. In a brief filed in
the Title VII case of Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, a Catholic school
argued that as an expressive association, it should not be required to maintain in employ-
ment a teacher who signed a pro-choice advertisement in the local newspaper. See Brief
of Appellees the Ursuline Academy of Wilmington at 35-39, Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline
Acad. of Wilmington, 450 F.3d 130 (3d Cit. 2006) (No. 04-4628). The brief does not
rely upon the Supreme Court's decision in FAIR, since it had not yet been decided, but
does use the Third Circuit's opinion in FAIR to support its argument. Id. at 36. The
Third Circuit's decision in Curay-Cramer, however, found for the school on other
grounds and did not address the expressive association argument. See Curay-Cramer,
450 F.3d at 142.
171. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
172. Id. at 78. This is not to say that all employment decisions made by employers
are subject to associational freedom claims. As Carpenter aptly points out, a school might
have expressive association rights when it chooses teachers, but it might not have such a
right when selecting maintenance or secretarial personnel. See Carpenter, supra note 58,
at 1577. The same type of analysis should also apply to employment decisions made
outside of the academic context.
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acknowledging that public law schools are just one potential type of
public employer. 3
To see why this interpretation of the law, if adopted, would be so damag-
ing, it is necessary to revisit the Dale decision to see what types of constitu-
tional protections groups enjoy once they are deemed expressive organizations.
B. The Impact of Dale Deference on Public Employee Civil Rights
In discussing the nature of the right to expressive association in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 74 the Supreme Court gave some important addi-
tional rights to expressive associations to be free from government regulation
that did not exist previously under Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees' and that could
have sweeping consequences for federal and state antidiscrimination laws. 6
As Justice Stevens commented in his Dale dissent, these additional rights
and the consequent amount of deference the Supreme Court gave to the
Boy Scouts' assertions concerning the nature of its expressive activities is
simply astounding.
77
173. Accord Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1564 (maintaining expressive associations like the
Boy Scouts in Dale should be protected in their selection of members and employees).
There is an argument against treating law schools like other public employers, based on cases
like Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), and Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), that institutions of higher education may be able to claim certain types
of First Amendment protections based on notions of institutional academic freedom. See Paul
Horwitz, Grutter's First Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 461, 468 (2005). As discussed below,
although institutions of higher education may have significant autonomy-based interests
grounded in the Constitution, I do not believe these interests rise to the level of constitutional
rights. See infra Part IV.A. As a result, public law school employers should not enjoy
enhanced constitutional standing under the First Amendment as compared to other public
employers, and FAIR's recognition of public employer expressive associations should not be
seen as limited to the academic context. See also infra note 253.
174. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
175. 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see McGowan, supra note 83, at 125 (maintaining that "[tihe
Court's stated deference [in Dale] was inconsistent with its analysis in prior cases").
176. See Farber, supra note 9, at 1492-93 ("[T]he upshot of the majority opinion [in Dale]
seems to be that once an association is identified as expressive, any colorable claim of interference
with its activities is enough to block application of anti-discrimination laws (at least in cases
where the Court does not find the particular state interest particularly compelling)."). Some
commentators have already spelled out what the recognition of these types of expressive
association rights in the private-sector workforce could mean for employee civil rights. See Magid
& Prenkert, supra note 120, 192-93 (arguing recent free exercise, hybrid rights, and associational
cases decided by the Supreme Court support religiously devoted employers' rights to promote
religion and disassociate from individuals who do not share their beliefs without violating
antidiscrimination laws).
177. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Once the organization 'asserts' that
it engages in particular expression... '[w]e cannot doubt' the truth of that assertion. This is an
astounding view of the law." (internal citations omitted)); id. ("It is an odd form of independent
review that consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims.").
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Once a group is found to be an expressive association, a court must
• 178
determine the nature of the group's expression. The scope of that inquiry
is limited, however, and the Court indicated in Dale that it was proper not
only to give deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of
its expression, but also to the association's view of what would impair that
expression.'79 So, in Dale, even though the evidence was extremely thin
that the Boy Scouts were actually promoting an antihomosexual message,'
8
the Court deferred to the Scouts' claim that inclusion of a high-profile gay
assistant scoutmaster would force the organization to send a message
inconsistent with its stance on homosexuality.' Based on the Boy Scouts'
assertions, the Court found that the New Jersey public accommodations
law, which would have required inclusion of the gay assistant scoutmaster,
caused a "severe intrusion" on the Boy Scouts' right to freedom of expres-
sive association that outweighed any countervailing compelling interest
that the state had in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.""
178. See id. at 650 (majority opinion).
179. See id. at 653. Going even further, the Court also said that "associations do not have
to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity
that could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection." Id. at 655. Consequently, an
employer could claim that hiring a certain individual as a member of its organization is inconsistent
with its views on a controversial topic, even though it did not engage in that hiring for the
purpose of taking a stance on that topic.
180. See id. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In light of [the Boy Scouts of Americal's self-
proclaimed ecumenism.. . it is even more difficult to discern any shared goals or common moral
stance on homosexuality.").
181. See id. at 648 (majority opinion) ("Forcing a group to accept certain members may
impair the ability of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to
express. Thus, '[fireedom of association ... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."'
(quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984))). Justice Stevens would have
required instead that a group adopt and advocate an unequivocal position before permitting
assertions of an expressive association right. See id. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see
Carpenter, supra note 58, at 1542-63 (criticizing Justice Stevens's message-based approach on
four different grounds); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong With Compelled
Association?, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 839, 846 (2005) (finding Justice Stevens's approach in Dale
"troubling and counterproductive" because "[giroups who tolerate or encourage within their
ranks internal dissent, experimentation, or critical re-examination are more likely to lose control
over their membership than those who adopt a posture of unyielding stridency").
182. Although Dale appears to imply that the state has a strong interest in eradicating sexual
orientation discrimination, the Court did not come out and say so explicitly, as it did in previous
cases dealing with gender discrimination. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 658. Furthermore, the Court
lessens the importance of that interest by engaging in a balancing of interests: "[Tihe associational
interest in freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale, and the State's interest
on the other." Id. at 658-59.
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It may first appear that FAIR, which does not concern a membership
situation like Dale,5 3 does not have much to add to Dale as far as the
consequences of labeling an organization an expressive association. But as
discussed above, FAIR can be read as providing expressive association rights
to public law schools.'" In fact, combining FAIR and Dale leads to the
startling conclusion that public employers can engage in expressive activities,
define the nature of their expressive association, determine which prospective
or current employees impair the message of their association, and then
disassociate from those individuals (by not hiring or taking other adverse
employment action), all without violating potentially applicable federal and
state antidiscrimination laws. 5 To make these consequences more concrete,
consider just a few hypotheticals.
First, consider a city police force that fires a female police offer on the
grounds that she had an abortion. The police department wishes to
propound a point of view that abortion is inconsistent with its mission of
protecting the lives of the innocent and believes that the continued
employment of the female police officer would impair that message. As
discussed in more detail below,18 6 that female police officer might have
substantive due process arguments in her favor in light of Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey'87 and Lawrence v. Texas,"
but it is anyone's guess whether those interests would be considered
compelling enough to overcome the "severe intrusion" on the police force's
expressive association rights occasioned by having to maintain the employ-
ment of that police officer. Moreover, to the extent that the female police
officer counters with a claim of sex discrimination, it is likely that such a
claim will be trumped by the police department's associational rights
under the Dale analysis. 9
183. See Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006). Indeed, the Court was not as
deferential in FAIR as it was in Dale, because FAIR itself is not a membership case.
184. See supra Parts I.C, III.A.
185. It may be that public employers can not still plausibly claim the right to exclude blacks
because of the strong antidiscrimination norms emanating from the Constitution, but the
civil rights of other historically excluded groups, who enjoy less protection under the law, would
certainly be at risk under this conception of the law. See Farber, supra note 9, at 1492-93
(suggesting Dale could mean that associational rights trump contrary civil rights under
antidiscrimination law); Magid & Prenkert, supra note 120, at 193 ("Dale portends an important
shift in the constitutional balance toward promoting associational freedoms over equality.").
186. See infra Part III.C.2.
187. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
188. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
189. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (finding Boy Scouts' expressive
association rights outweigh any competing state interests in eradicating discrimination).
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Second, contemplate for a moment the hypothetical brought up by Justice
Souter in his Dale dissent, in which an individual becomes "so identified
with a position as to epitomize it publicly."'90 Once a group is recognized as
an expressive association, Justice Souter indicates that such high-profile
individuals may be excluded by that group to maintain the effectiveness of
its message, even if such exclusions would normally run afoul of otherwise
applicable federal and state antidiscrimination laws.'9 ' Needless to say,
Justice Souter's hypothetical could easily apply to the employment context.'92
Finally, reflect on the lower court decision in FAIR itself. The district
court concluded that since the law schools had adopted official policies
with respect to sexual orientation, the law schools qualified as expressive
associations.'93 In coming to this conclusion, the court noted that FAIR law
schools believe that "invidious discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is a moral wrong, and that 'judgments about people bearing no
relation to merit harm and inhibits students, faculty, and eventually society
at large."" 94 Given the nature of the law schools' expressive association and
Dale's notion that courts should defer to the group's assertion about what
would impair its expression, 9' it would appear that a FAIR law school could
argue that hiring a prospective faculty member who previously served in the
military's Judge Advocate General's (JAG) Corps would be tantamount to
hiring a person with antigay views and refuse to hire such a person. As
absurd as that claim may sound, remember that Dale counsels extreme
deference both to the nature of an association's expression and to the
association's views of what would impair that expression.' 96 If that member
of the military makes a claim of discrimination based on veteran status
under a state employment antidiscrimination statute, he or she might well
lose the case based on the law school's contrary associational claims.' 97
As these examples make clear, the recognition of expressive associa-
tion rights for public law schools, and, by extension, all public employers,
190. See id. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
191. See id. ("When that position is at odds with a group's advocated position, applying
an antidiscrimination statute to require the group's acceptance of the individual in a position of
group leadership could so modify or muddle or frustrate the group's advocacy as to violate the
expressive associational right.").
192. For an example of how such a scenario could play out, consider the case of Robert
Delahunty discussed in Part III.C.1.
193. FAIR v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269,304 (D.N.J. 2003).
194. Id.
195. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 659 ("The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do
not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association.").
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would entail a vast accretion of employer power to potentially exclude
unpopular, controversial, or just plain disagreeable employees from the public
sector. Even more troubling, this power to exclude employees would be
largely immunized from antidiscrimination laws.19
C. The Effects of Public Employer Expressive Association Rights
on Existing Public Employee Constitutional Rights
As detrimental as Dale expressive association rights might be to public
employee civil rights, this constitutional development may prove more
devastating to the already vastly diminished constitutional rights of public
employees. Since public employee free speech protection reached its
apogee in Pickering v. Board of Education,"9 these rights have been greatly
weakened as a result of the "public concern" test of Connick v. Myers2" and
the more recent "official capacity speech" test of Garcetti v. Ceballos.2 °1
While Connick requires that the public employee speech at issue be
directed toward matters of public importance if it is to be provided a
modicum of First Amendment protection,"2 Garcetti robs even "public
concern" speech of constitutional protection if it is spoken in accordance
with the employee's official duties.03
But the situation would become even worse for public employees if
courts recognized public employer expressive association rights. Quite
simply, it is a zero-sum game, and whatever additional power the
government gains to make employment decisions through these new
expressive association rights must necessarily come at the expense of public
employees' constitutional rights. A couple of real world examples, one
academic in the First Amendment context and one nonacademic in the
substantive due process context, will suffice to illustrate the point.
198. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. There is a counterargument that
since Dale was decided in 2000, there have not been many private employers advancing
associational claims with a related reduction of employee civil rights in the private sector.
But such claims do exist, see supra note 170 (discussing the Title VII religious discrimination case
of Curay-Cramer v. The Ursuline Academy of Wilmington), have been advanced in the religious
discrimination context by academic commentators, see Magid & Prenkert, supra note 120, at 192-93,
and may become more prevalent in light of FAIR.
199. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
200. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
201. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
202. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
203. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
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1. The Case of Robert Delahunty
Controversy erupted at the University of Minnesota Law School" 4 over
the decision to hire Robert Delahunty as a visiting professor."' Delahunty
previously held a position in the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel, where he coauthored one of the now-infamous memos in which
he opined that the Geneva Conventions and War Crimes Act did not apply
to at Qaeda and Taliban war prisoners." When word got out that Minnesota
planned to appoint Delahunty to this position, a group of Minnesota law
professors sent an open letter0 7 and a significant number of students
circulated a petition to protest the appointment as antithetical to the
core values held by the institution.08 The student petition stated, "[wle
would like to make clear that we are supportive of an ideologically
diverse faculty, we would simply prefer that the University be extremely
protective of its reputation by hiring faculty that are beyond question
ethically.'2"" The interim co-deans of the University of Minnesota did not
bow to the pressure, however, and Delahunty began teaching classes at the
law school in January 2007.210
Regardless, the story provides an opportunity to consider what the
detrimental impact would be on public employees' First Amendment rights
204. Interestingly, the faculty of the University of Minnesota Law School is one of the
public law school members of FAIR. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
205. See Paul D. Thacker, Appointment Roils a Law School, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Nov. 29,
2006, available at http://insidehighered.com/layout/set/print/news/2006/1 1/29/delahunty. Robert
Delahunty was a constitutional law professor at the University of St. Thomas Law School.
206. See Memorandum from John Yoo & Robert J. Delabunty [sic], to William J. Haynes II,
Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def., Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees
(Jan. 9, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 38 (Karen J. Greenberg &
Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). "[Tlhe memo concluded that the Geneva Convention did not cover
al-Qaeda suspects captured in Afghanistan, and helped lay the foundation for the Bush administra-
tion's handling of prisoners captured during the war on terror." Thacker, supra note 205.
207. See Letter from University of Minnesota Law School to Members of the University of
Minnesota Law School's Community, available at http://insidehighered.com/index.php/content/
download/104089/138963 1/file/DelahuntyLTRNov28,2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
208. See Thacker, supra note 205.
209. Petition to Ask the Deans to Reconsider the Hiring of Robert Delahunty,
http://insidehighered.com/index.php/content/download/104088/1389628/file/Delahunty%
20petition.doc (last visited Mar. 20, 2007). The petition went on to state: "We place a
considerable value on the reputation that comes with being in a law school with this level of prestige,
and we would like to avoid any negative connotations that will result from hiring a person with
such a negative and divisive reputation as Delahunty." Id.
210. See Karlee Weinmann, Outcry at Law School Quiets, MINNESOTA DAILY, Jan. 23, 2007,
available at http://www.mndaily.com/articles/2007/01/23/70418.
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if a public law school had constitutional rights of expressive association."I
In this regard, Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees makes clear that expressive associa-
tions have the right to be free from "intrusion into the[ir] internal structure
or affairs''212 and that such groups cannot be forced, without compelling
justification, to accept members they do not desire. In other words, the
freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.
2
,I
And although compelling justifications may have existed for the Jaycees
and Rotarians to be forced to accept female members,215 it is unlikely that
the same level of justification exists to compel Minnesota Law School to
associate with Delahunty."6
Recall that the Court in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale217 gave great
deference to not only the group's assertions about the nature of its expres-
sion, but also to its views about what would impair that expression."' Thus,
in a world where a public law school has expressive association rights, the
school might not hire a Delahunty in order to transmit a certain set of values
and not others. 9 Indeed, the student petition against Delahunty relied on
an argument of this type when it requested that the Minnesota Law School
not affiliate with anyone of questionable ethical background. 20  Finally,
recall that Justice Souter indicated in his Dale dissent that in cases in
211. It may be that the First Amendment rights of public employees like Delahunty are
already, without any consideration of expressive association rights, severely circumscribed by
the government speech doctrine, under which the government employer may claim, without
First Amendment concern, the ability to hire only those individuals willing to transmit its
values or propound its chosen point of view. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550,
559 (2005) ("We have generally assumed.., that compelled funding of government speech does
not alone raise First Amendment concerns."). As will be explored below, however, the
government speech doctrine is probably most tenuous in the public university professor context.
See infra Part IV.B.2.




215. See id. at 624; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537,549 (1987).
216. Claims of ideological discrimination, at least outside of political party affiliation cases
like Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990), do not enjoy heightened judicial
scrutiny like gender or race discrimination claims.
217. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
218. Id. at 653.
219. Stanley Fish, for one, does not agree that "schools should[ I have values, except
in a very narrow sense," and "should avoid taking a political stance at all cost." Elia Powers, A
Freewheeling Academic Freedom Debate, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Jan. 5, 2007, available at
http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/01/O5/acfreedom (describing remarks Fish made during
the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS)). Indeed,
Fish brought up the FAIR case during a recent talk to illustrate his point. See id.
220. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
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which a high-profile individual becomes the public embodiment of a
certain controversial position, like Delahunty has on the terrorist
detainment issue, expressive associations should be able to insulate their
expression by disassociating from such individuals.21
Delahunty could respond to this invocation of expressive association
rights by claiming that his past stance on matters of public concern is
protected from adverse employment action by the First Amendment."
Indeed, cases like Pickering v. Board of Education... and Connick v. Myers..4
stand for the proposition that public employees have certain rights to
speech and expression for which they cannot be retaliated against, unless
the public employer can point to overriding and legitimate efficiency
•225
interests. But Pickering First Amendment claims are rather weak ones in
the constitutional hierarchy of rights, given the needs of government
employers to run their workplaces.226 Such rights, even under current
doctrine, may be overcome by a mere showing that the employee's expres-
sion would substantially disrupt the employer's enterprise. 7 On the other
hand, expressive association rights are much more sacrosanct and may be
221. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting). Of course, in Justice Souter's
hypothetical, he was suggesting that such expressive association rights of a group would overcome
any contrary antidiscrimination laws. See id.
222. Such an argument should be available to Delahunty, as Pickering v. Board of Education
applies to retaliatory hiring decisions based on a prospective employee's prior protected
expression. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) ("We have ... recognized that
the government's power as an employer to make hiring and firing decisions on the basis of what
its employees and prospective employees say has a much greater scope than its power to regu-
late expression by the general public." (citations omitted)); see also Worrell v. Henry, 219
F.3d 1197, 1207 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying the Pickering balancing test in the hiring context);
Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1102-03 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (applying the Pickering
balancing test to a government employer's withdrawal of a job offer); Hubbard v. EPA, 949
F.2d 453, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (applying the Pickering balancing test to a hiring decision,
observing that "[mlerely because an employer is hiring rather than firing.., does not justify
unconstitutional action").
223. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
224. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
225. Id. at 143-44; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
226. See Paul M. Secunda, The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence: The Constitutionalization
of Public Employee Rights to Decisional Non-Interference in Private Affairs, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 85, 97 (2006) ("Yet even though the government employer does not possess unfettered
discretion when it comes to impinging upon the exercise of its employees' constitutional rights,
it retains substantial latitude when setting the terms and conditions of its employees' employment,
a discretion which is not available in its dealing with the same individuals as citizens." (citing
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518
U.S. 668, 674 (1996); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,671-72 (1994) (plurality opinion))).
227. See id. at 97-101 (citing Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005)) (discussing the substantial disruption theory of the Pickering
line of cases).
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overcome only "by regulations adopted to serve compelling state
interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."
28
If one were therefore to balance public employer expressive association
rights against public employee Pickering First Amendment rights, given the
nature of the interests involved, it is more than likely that the government
employer would prevail in the vast majority of these cases.229 Put differently,
it is unlikely that the somewhat attenuated public employee right to free
speech would qualify as the compelling state interest necessary to overcome
the public employer's expressive association right. 2 0 In short, this hypotheti-
cal exercise indicates that recognition of public law school expressive
association rights in a case like Delahunty's would almost certainly diminish
individual public employees' rights to free speech and expression."'
2. The Case of Debora Hobbs
The impact of expanding expressive association rights would not be
limited to public law schools or to the First Amendment context, as the
next example illustrates. In a previous article, I wrote about a female sheriff
dispatcher, Debora Hobbs, in Penders County, North Carolina, who was
told by her supervising sheriff to marry her live-in boyfriend, move out, or
228. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
229. Even if the employee somehow beat the odds and won his or her constitutional claim,
the employer might still be considered the winner in the long run if the turmoil from such legal
battles has a chilling effect on controversial speech from unknown future hires. In other words, public
law schools and other public employers will likely be very careful with their future employment
decisions and will make sure they are noncontroversial. Indeed, after this debacle, it will be inter-
esting to see if the University of Minnesota Law School appoints anyone with even close to the same
type of controversial background as Delahunty. I am indebted to Nancy Levit for this additional insight.
230. So even though Dale did not involve a case in which there was an assertion of a
countervailing constitutional right by the scoutmaster, the relatively weak First Amendment right
that public employees have under Pickering and its progeny would likely be outweighed by contrary
expressive association rights held by the public employer. In this sense, a public employee like
Delahunty would be no better off with his Pickering constitutional rights than the gay
scoutmaster was in Dale with his statutory rights under the New Jersey public accommodations law.
231. Some might like this outcome because they do not agree with Delahunty's views on the
Geneva Conventions and terrorist detainees. But one could easily imagine a similar case
involving a public employee with more progressive views being excluded from the association of a
more conservative public law school. Suppose that, like the Boy Scouts, a conservative public
university does not want to associate with an outspoken gay rights activist and refuses to hire him
or her. Again, the rights afforded to expressive associations under Roberts, Dale, and similar cases
would seem to permit the university to refuse to hire such an individual, even though this would
appear to be an instance of a governmental entity blatantly interfering with a public employee's
First Amendment rights to advocate his or her views on matters of public concern.
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lose her job.232 The sheriff based his demand on an 1805 state cohabitation
statute. The female dispatcher lost her position when she refused to comply.23
She sued in state court and won based on the court finding, in light of Laurrence
v. Texas,"' that her firing unconstitutionally infringed her liberty interests
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.235 Although
the state court's exact reasoning does not appear in a published decision,236
the strongest argument to support its holding is that a public employer must
have a substantial and legitimate interest before interfering with an employee's
off-duty private and personal decisions in matters pertaining to sex."'
But what if the sheriff's department could claim a right to expressive
association based on language in FAIR? The argument would go that
central to maintaining the image and credibility of a law enforcement
agency in a socially conservative part of the country is the ability to
hire only individuals who hold the traditional values of their community,
including the values associated with traditional forms of marriage. Thus,
requiring the sheriffs department to employ those who choose to express
other values by cohabitating without being married (whether they are
heterosexual or homosexual) forces the department to promote
nontraditional conduct outside of marriage as a legitimate form of behavior.
Dale stands for the proposition that expressive associations have
the right not to be forced to send a message that is contrary to their
chosen beliefs.238 As discussed previously, Dale also indicated that a court
232. See Secunda, supra note 226, at 131-32 (citing Steve Hartsoe, ACLU Challenges N.C.
Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST, May 10, 2005, at A06).
233. See id.
234. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas antisodomy statute based on the liberty
interest individuals have in making decisions about their personal and private lives).
235. See Andrea Weigl, Judge Rules Against Cohabitation Law, NEWS & OBSERVER, July 21,
2006, available at http://www.newsobserver.com/102/story/462833.html; see also Posting of Paul M.
Secunda to Workplace Prof Blog, North Carolina Cohabitation Law Struck Down in Case of Female
Sheriff Dispatcher, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2006/07/northcarolina_.html
(July 21, 2006). 1 refer to this liberty interest recognized in Lawrence as a public employee's right to
decisional noninterference in private affairs. See Secunda, supra note 226, at 115-19.
236. See Judge Rules N.C. Anti-Cohabitation Law Unconstitutional, USA TODAY, July 21,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-21-cohabitation-x.htm ("State
Superior Court Judge Benjamin Alford issued the ruling late Wednesday, saying the law violated
Hobbs' constitutional right to liberty. He cited the 2003 U.S. Supreme Court case titled Lawrence
v. Texas, which struck down a Texas sodomy law.").
237. See Secunda, supra note 226, at 116.
238. See Boy Scouts of Am v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,653 (2000); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 633 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Protection of the association's right to define its membership
derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice, and
the selection of members is the definition of that voice."). But see Shiffrin, supra note 181, at 841 ("As with
compelled speech, our concern should be turned inward onto the internal thinking process of group members,
rather than predominantly on whether there is confusion in the transmission of a group's message.").
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must defer to the organization's characterization of its expression, as well as
the organization's belief as to what would impair it.239 These principles
suggest that a court reviewing the Penders County sheriff's decision to
fire Hobbs for cohabitation would have little ability to inquire into the
bona fides of the county's putative values and would have to take the
county at its word that its expressive association would be harmed by having
as members those with nontraditional values such as Hobbs.
Nor would a reading of Lawrence v. Texas that recognizes a heightened
liberty interest in decisional noninterference in employees' private affairs
make a difference once public employers were endowed with expressive
association rights. Although the modified Pickering analysis that I
previously proposed would not permit a public employer to interfere with its
employee's private and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex)
without legitimate and substantial justification,2" the public employer's
right to expressive association-to choose not to propound a point of view
contrary to its belief-would certainly suffice as a substantial and legitimate
justification. Thus, recognition of public employer expressive association
rights would turn the clock back on public employee civil liberties and
retard newly emerging substantive due process rights for public employees.
IV. STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS, EFFICIENCY INTERESTS,
AND THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE
A. The Structural Argument Against Public Expressive Associations
Although a number of the normative reasons illustrated above counsel
against recognizing public law schools and public employers as expressive
associations, the most persuasive argument against the Supreme Court's
unfortunate assumption in Rumsfeld v. FAIR is a structural one. It is simply
this: The Bill of Rights protects the rights of the governed, not the governing." '
239. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
240. See Secunda, supra note 226, at 118-19.
241. Justice Stewart made this very point in his concurrence in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 139 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The First
Amendment protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection
on the Government."). As Fagundes has pointed out in his excellent recent piece on government
speech, and though Fagundes himself thoughtfully challenges this notion, Stewart's concurrence
remains the majority view in this area of the law. See Fagundes, supra note 20, at 1643 ("[Wlhen
the question of whether the First Amendment applies to government speech has arisen,
judges have typically acknowledged Justice Stewart's concurrence without critical reflection, result-
ing in what one district court called 'the well-settled point of law that the First Amendment
protects only citizens' speech rights from government regulation, and does not apply to government
1804 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1767 (2007)
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In this regard, the discussion in the recent case of Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action v. Granholm242 is instructive. The case concerned whether
the court should preliminarily enjoin the recently adopted Michigan
amendment banning the use of race preferences from going into effect,
especially the part that applies to public universities."' The court denied
the requested injunctive relief based on its holding that the First and
Fourteenth Amendments permit states to use certain forms of affirmative
action, but does not mandate that they do so.244
In its losing argument, the public universities in Michigan
2 41
maintained that "they have an academic freedom right, based in the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to select their
students and that they may, in the course of doing so, give some
consideration to such factors ... as race." '246 Dismissing this claim, the Sixth
Circuit made the point that the schools' "interests" in selecting a diverse
student body should not be confused with schools having actual First
speech itself.' (citing Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941,
944-45 (W.D. Va. 2001))); see also Morriss, supra note 8, at 440 ("These [state law school
members of FAIR], as instrumentalities of state government, have no First Amendment rights.").
242. 473 F.3d 237 (6th Cit. 2006).
243. See id. at 239-40. The court described the underlying facts as follows:
On November 7, 2006, the people of Michigan approved a statewide ballot
initiative-Proposal 2-which amended the Michigan Constitution to prohibit discrimina-
tion or preferential treatment based on race or gender in the operation of public
employment, public education, or public contracting in the State. Under the Michigan
Constitution, the proposal was scheduled to go into effect on December 23, 2006.
Id. at 239-40.
244. Id. at 240.
245. The public universities were the University of Michigan, Michigan State University,
and Wayne State University. Id.
246. Id. at 242; see also id. at 247. Interestingly, with regard to an institutional academic
freedom right, William Van Alstyne observed at a recent panel discussion on academic
freedom at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the AALS that although there were some thirty
decisions from the Supreme Court using the doctrine of institutional academic freedom, not
one of them relied directly on that right for its holding. See William Van Alstyne,
Remarks at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools (Jan. 4,
2007), available at http://www3.cali.org/aalsO7/mp3/AALS%202007%20%20Plenary%20Session
%20Academic%20Freedom%20200700104.mp3; see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 412
(4th Cit. 2000) (en banc) ("Despite these accolades, the Supreme Court has never set aside a
state regulation on the basis that it infringed a First Amendment right to academic freedom."
(citing Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Coils. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 287 (1984))); Horwitz, supra
note 173, at 526 (arguing that the Third Circuit FAIR decision can be understood as
saying that "academic freedom claims of the kind pressed by the plaintiffs in FAIR are
parasitic-that one cannot bring a free-standing claim of academic freedom under the First
Amendment, although academic freedom itself may lend weight to arguments based on other
First Amendment claims").
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Amendment rights. 47 After all, the court observed, it is not at all clear "how
the Universities, as subordinate organs of the State, have First Amendment
rights against the State or its voters., 248  In other words, the Constitution
protects the people from the state, not the state from the people.249
Nor does the analysis change when considering one of the points
emphasized in Grutter v. Bollinger25 : Public universities' academic decisions
concerning complex educational judgments should be given a substantial
degree of deference by the courts.25 ' The Sixth Circuit in Granholm refuted
this point by noting that the Grutter Court more specifically stated that
this degree of deference should only be granted "within constitution-
ally prescribed limits" '252 and "[olne of those 'constitutionally prescribed
limits'.., is the separate requirement of narrow tailoring-an inquiry that
no one maintains may be satisfied simply by invoking a university's
legitimate, but hardly dispositive, interest in academic freedom."2"
Based on this line of reasoning, the Granholm court concluded that the
247. See Granholm, 473 F.3d at 247 ("The Universities mistake interests grounded in
the First Amendment-including their interests in selecting student bodies-with First
Amendment rights."). But see Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412 ("The Supreme Court, to the extent it has
constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to have recognized only an
institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs.").
248. Granholm, 473 F.3d at 247 (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)).
249. See id.; see also Fagundes, supra note 20, at 1638 ("[Tlhe Speech Clause is typically
understood as a bulwark of protection against-rather than a source of rights for-government.");
id. at 1639 ("Courts have varied in their receptivity to the notion that the First Amendment may
extend to government speech. The majority of courts have. .. rel[ied] on the assumption that the
First Amendment can only restrict, not protect, state actors." (citing Muir v. Ala. Educ.
Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1038 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc))). But see Nadel v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 197 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing speech rights
for government actors); County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387,
1390 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (same).
250. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
251. See id. at 328-29 ("We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of
public education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.").
252. Granholm, 473 F.3d at 248.
253. Id. In this regard, one can see the universities' interests in institutional
academic freedom as similar to the efficiency interests that the Court has recognized in the
Pickering public employment free speech context. See infra Part IV.B. As in Pickering,
these important public entity interests do not rise to the level of a constitutional right.
Significantly, this understanding, correct in my view, undercuts the argument that public
university employers are sui generis and that whatever the Court assumed in FAIR with
regard to public law schools' expressive association rights does not equally apply to other
public employers.
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universities have no First Amendment right to continue their racial prefer-
ences as part and parcel of their rights to institutional academic freedom."'
If public universities do not have First Amendment rights to select
diverse student bodies, then surely they also lack constitutional rights when
selecting members of their faculties. Deciding who teaches, like deciding
who to admit to study, is one of the four essential freedoms discussed by
Justice Frankfurter in his concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire."'
Although the Supreme Court has historically given substantial deference
to academic decisions by universities related to their educational mission 25 --and
the hiring of faculty may be considered such a decision257-Supreme Court
case law does not support the notion that public universities have First
Amendment rights sounding in institutional academic freedom to choose
their faculty members."' Moreover, many university employment decisions
254. See id. But see Fagundes, supra note 20, at 1662 (maintaining that "[the majority rule
proscribing constitutional status for government speech.., fails to account for a scenario in which
the federal government wrongly attempts to restrict the speech of another sovereign, or where govern-
ment speech merits application of a statute or common law doctrine that is designed to safeguard
constitutional speech interests"). Although Fagundes's thoughts on the First Amendment rights of
state actors are thought-provoking, his categories for when government speech should be consti-
tutionally protected nonetheless do not appear to cover instances in which state public universities or
public employers seek to assert constitutional rights against the contrary First Amendment rights of
their public employees. In other words, public employment does not raise the more difficult
question, present in FAIR, of whether, under principles of federalism, a state should be able to assert
First Amendment rights or traditional state powers against federal government intrusions. Cf. Grutter,
539 U.S. at 328; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (noting that the federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) law constitutes "considerable congressional intrusion into the States'
traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens").
255. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
256. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) ("When judges are
asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should
show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."); see also Bd. of Curators of the Univ.
of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1978) ("Academic evaluations of a student, in contrast
to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative
factfinding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement.").
257. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YALE L.J. 251, 319 (1989) ("Peer review certainly comes within the protection of institutional
academic freedom if any university activity other than teaching and scholarship does. Peer review
is the canonical procedure for determining 'who will teach."'); David M. Rabban, A Functional
Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1990, at 227, 266 ("These four freedoms ... seem to cover
appointment, promotion, tenuring, and termination of faculty .... ").
258. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 199 (1990) (refusing to recognize an
expanded constitutional right of institutional academic freedom to protect confidential peer
review materials from disclosure). Indeed, neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts have ever
satisfactorily explained the scope and the meaning of the institutional academic freedom
doctrine. Horwitz, supra note 173, at 469; see also Byrne, supra note 257, at 320 ("One reason that
institutional academic freedom remains little more than a potential constitutional right is
that it has not been explained satisfactorily by legal scholars.").
HeinOnline  -- 54 UCLA L. Rev. 1807 2006-2007
are not even considered academic decisions for purposes of the academic
freedom doctrine, and, therefore, lie outside the realm of cases in which
courts have given deference to the judgment of the university. '59 In such
cases, there is even less of an argument that the employment decisions of
the public university are due some form of constitutional protection.
In short, given the strength of these structural arguments and the weak
foundations for claims of public university constitutional rights based on
notions of institutional academic freedom, it is likely that if the Supreme
Court were to consider the issue head on, it would not deem the FAIR public
law schools, or any other public employer, to be expressive associations.26°
However, because of the confusion engendered by the FAIR Court in this
area of the law, the Supreme Court should not merely correct this oversight
in the next case in which it has the opportunity to discuss expressive
association rights. It should set out a coherent understanding of what type
of rights public employers, including public universities acting in that
capacity, have in deciding how best to convey certain messages to the
public and protect their institutions' core values. The Court should
take its cue from the Sixth Circuit and deem such important claims to be
interests, rather than rights, and analyze these interests with other govern-
mental efficiency concerns under the Connick-Pickering First Amendment
free speech framework. At the same time, the Court should step back
from the abyss it reached in Garcetti v. Ceballos and not too quickly
assume that all government employees are engaged in unprotected
government speech every time they express themselves in line with
their job duties.
259. See Stastny v. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Wash. Univ., 647 P.2d 496, 504 (Wash. Ct. App.
1982) ('It does not follow that because academic freedom is inextricably related to the educational
process it is implicated in every employment decision of an educational institution."'
(quoting Kunda v. Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 547 (3d Cir. 1980))).
260. The FAIR Court appeared willing to proceed on this assumption only because
most of its analytical energies were consumed by more difficult issues, such as the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions, the congressional power to raise and support armies, and a
number of obtuse First Amendment speech doctrines, including the doctrines of compelled
speech and expressive conduct. Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 58-68 (2006). Even in
the expressive association portion of the case, the Court seemed unconcerned about the
nature or the constituents of the FAIR expressive association and focused instead on
whether having military recruiters on law school campuses significantly burdened law
school rights to expressive association. Id. at 69-70.
1808 54 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1767 (2007)
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B. A Return to Pickering Efficiency Interests and a Detour Around
the Government Speech Doctrine
1. Pickering Efficiency Interests
To reiterate a point made in the previous Subpart, university academic
judgments are better conceived of as interests grounded in the First
Amendment, rather than constitutional rights. This conception of the
academic employer's interests in exercising discretion to decide who to hire
and retain as employees is consistent with similar governmental efficiency
interests already discussed in the Pickering line of cases.
The scope of Pickering v. Board of Education26' was most recently
clarified by the Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos 62 In Garcetti, a deputy district
attorney for Los Angeles County, Richard Ceballos, was subjected to
adverse employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly defective
search warrant in a criminal case.263 The question presented to the Supreme
Court was whether Ceballos had engaged in speech protected by the First
Amendment, such that he could not be retaliated against for his actions
with regard to the search warrant."
In its analysis in Garcetti, the Court noted that the Connick-Pickering
analysis requires courts in public employee free speech cases to consider
whether the employee spoke in his or her capacity as a citizen on a matter
of a public concern,26 and if so, courts must then balance the First
Amendment interests of the employee against the government employer's
interest in efficiency."' The governmental interests recognized in Pickering
261. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
262. 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006).
263. See id. at 1955-56.
264. Id. at 1955. As far as answering that question, the Court found in Garcetti that because
Richard Ceballos was engaged in expression consistent with his job duties, he was not speaking as
a citizen on a matter of public concern, but only as a government employee. As such, the Court
concluded that Ceballos did not have any First Amendment protection and there was no need to
conduct a Pickering balancing of interests. See id. at 1960 ("We hold that when public employees
make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for
First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from
employer discipline.").
265. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
266. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 1 have recently argued that this same type of Pickering
analysis should be extended to the substantive due process area in the context of sexual privacy
rights in light of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). Under this reasoning, employees should also be free from decisional interference by their
employers in their private and personal affairs, unless the government can point to overriding
efficiency interests. See Secunda, supra note 226, at 122-24.
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are not in any sense constitutional rights, but rather interests government
employers have in maintaining "a significant degree of control over their
employees' words and actions" because "without it, there would be little
,,211chance for the efficient provision of public services. The balance
undertaken in Pickering is required because even though the government
employer performs "important public functions"268 and consequently possesses
far broader powers in its employer capacity than in its sovereign capacity,
269
"a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen.""27 The
First Amendment therefore limits the ability of the employer to condition
employment on the forfeiture of the employee's constitutional rights.27'
Similarly, the interests that public employers have in advocating
certain views and policies and maintaining the core values of their institu-
tions may be seen as more akin to Pickering efficiency interests than a First
Amendment right to expressive association.12  As the Garcetti Court
observed: "Supervisors must ensure that their employees' official communi-
cations are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and promote the employer's
mission."'273 In setting out the relevant interests, the Court utilizes the lan-
guage of efficiency interests, not of employer expressive association rights.274
If a public employer wishes not to hire a prospective employee because
that employee has engaged in controversial speech through the written
word, like Delahunty,275 or through nontraditional living arrangements, like
Hobbs,276 the proper analysis is not to suggest that the government employer
has a constitutional right as an expressive association to disassociate itself
from those individuals it deems are promoting antithetical messages.
267. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1958 (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 143).
268. See id. at 1959 (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987)).
269. See id. at 1958 (citing Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
270. Id.
271. See id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions figured prominently in Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006)
("Under this principle, known as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Solomon
Amendment would be unconstitutional if Congress could not directly require universities
to provide military recruiters equal access to their students.").
272. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 ("Employers have heightened interests in controlling
speech made by an employee in his or her professional capacity. Official communications have
official consequences, creating a need for substantive consistency and clarity.").
273. Id: (emphasis added).
274. This is particularly telling; since Garcetti was decided only about three months after
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, one would have expected some comment about expressive association rights
if the Court had recognized the implications of its own statements in FAIR. Clearly, however,
the Court did not understand its FAIR decision in this manner.
275. See supra Part III.C.1.
276. See supra Part III.C.2.
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Rather, a court should determine whether the constitutional rights of the
individual cannot be recognized without substantially disrupting the public
employer's enterprise.277 This proposed analysis is more consistent with
constitutional doctrine in the public employer area and does not take the
unprecedented step of suggesting that government employers have First
Amendment rights.
2. The Menace of the Government Speech Doctrine to Public Employee
First Amendment Rights
Pickering thus provides the proper framework for understanding how
courts should conceive public employer interests to promote certain
messages. However, the government speech doctrine has the ability to
wreak havoc on public employees' remaining constitutional rights in a large
subcategory of official capacity speech cases by taking away public employees'
Pickering rights.
In coming to its conclusion in Garcetti that Ceballos did not have First
Amendment rights because he was acting in accordance with his job duties,
the Court commented that Ceballos's speech "owe[d] its existence to [his]
professional responsibilities" and "simply reflects the exercise of employer
control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.""27 In
making this point, the Court cited to Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
University of Virginia, 79 with a parenthetical that "when government appro-
priates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it is
entitled to say what it wishes.""28 This language in turn derives from similar
277. 1 do not mean to suggest that the Pickering balance does not have its own shortcomings.
Its reliance on determining constitutional rights based on whether a public employee's
conduct causes his or her employer substantial disruption comes close to constitutionalizing
the heckler's veto. See Kozel, supra note 227, at 1018-19 ("Such a test is inconsistent with the
notion of robust exchange of divergent ideas, as it leaves vulnerable the speech that is most likely
to have a strong effect.").
278. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960.
279. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
280. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1960 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833). Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia involved a student-run Christian newspaper at the
University of Virginia. 515 U.S. 819. The Court concluded that it was viewpoint
discrimination to deny funding to the newspaper. However, the outcome would have been
different if the university spoke itself or subsidized the transmittal of a favored message. See
id. at 833-34.
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language in the abortion funding case of Rust v. Sullivan,28' another case
that relies on the government speech doctrine.282
Under the government speech doctrine, individuals can be compelled to
subsidize government speech without violating their First Amendment
rights.23  The Court in Garcetti thus seems to suggest that characterizing
Ceballos's expression as government speech helps to explain why he has no
First Amendment rights when speaking in his official capacity, whereas nor-
mally under the Connick-Pickering framework, he would. Such a broad notion
of public employee speech as government speech, however, could all but
wipe out a significant portion of public employee First Amendment rights."M
Fortunately, it does not appear that the Court is willing to take the
government speech doctrine in the public employment context to that
length quite yet. Instead, the cite to the Rosenberger case in Garcetti was a
"cf." cite, suggesting that the "[c]ited authority supports a proposition
different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend
support.""2 ' In other words, there is still room to doubt that the government
speech doctrine applies in its adulterated form to all public employee speech
cases in which statements are made pursuant to official duties.
Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent provided ample reason why the
government speech analysis should be mostly extraneous to the Pickering
doctrine. He noted that "[s]ome public employees are hired to 'promote a par-
ticular policy' by broadcasting a particular message set by the government,
but not everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak
from a government manifesto."2" Indeed, as Justice Souter pointed out, no
evidence exists that Ceballos himself was hired to "broadcast[ ] a particular
281. 500 U.S. 173, 174-75 (1991).
282. See id. at 192-93 ("[G]overnment may 'make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds."' (quoting
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977))). Rust did not involve private speech, but
employed private speakers to transmit specific information related to the government's
prohibition on abortion-related advice. See id. at 194.
283. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) ("[lIt seems inevitable
that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate
and defend its own policies. We have generally assumed.., that compelled funding of govern-
ment speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns." (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229 (2000))).
284. See Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The fallacy of the majority's
reliance on Rosenberger's understanding of Rust doctrine... portends a bloated notion of controllable
government speech going well beyond the circumstances of this case.").
285. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 47 (Columbia Law
Review Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005).
286. Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v.
Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001)).
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message set by the government"; instead, he was hired "to enforce the
law by constitutional action .... ,,287 Similarly, no one would seriously
argue that public university professors are hired to parrot a particular
288government message.
In short, although Justice Souter conceded that there may be some
public employees who are hired to advance specific governmental policies
and thus fall under the government speech doctrine, many public employ-
ees, including government lawyers, do not. Souter is right that "Rust is no
authority for the notion that the government may exercise plenary control
over every comment made by a public employee in doing his job."2 9 Here's
hoping that in the future, the Supreme Court recognizes Garcetti's error in
this regard and takes a mere "cf." for what it is worth.
CONCLUSION
Neither public law schools nor public employers have the constitu-
tional right to expressive association as Rumsfeld v. FAIR implicitly
assumes. This state 9 f affairs will eventually be rectified, given the strong
constitutional structural arguments in opposition to such an interpretation.
Such a modification, however, should be accompanied by a unifying theory
about how government efficiency interests in maintaining core values and
promoting certain messages should be balanced against the First Amendment
rights of public employees to engage in protected constitutional activities.
In some cases, then, public employers should be permitted to adhere
to core values and promote certain messages as a part of their Pickering
efficiency interests in running their organizations as they see fit. Even so,
these efficiency interests must be balanced against employee constitutional
rights and cannot simply override such interests. Furthermore, the govern-
ment speech doctrine should not be read expansively into the public
employment context to strip public employees of constitutional rights when
they are acting pursuant to their official duties. Instead, that doctrine
should be limited to only those instances in which a public employee has
been hired to actually promote a specific governmental message.
287. Id.
288. See id. ("This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is
spacious enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor. ... ). The
majority grants that different considerations might apply when the academic freedom
concerns of professors engaged in teaching and scholarship are involved, but does not
decide that issue since Garcetti itself does not concern academic freedom. See id. at 1962
(majority opinion).
289. Id. at 1969 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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